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Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Notification and Authorization  
NASA's Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is stimulating efforts within the private sector to 
develop and demonstrate safe, reliable, and cost-effective space transportation capabilities.  One 
initiative involves investigating the use of commercial electronic parts.  NASA's CCP asked the 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to collect data to help frame the technical, cost, 
and schedule risk trades associated with electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts 
selection and specifically expressed desire of some of the CCP partners to employ EEE parts of a 
lower grade than traditionally used in most NASA safety-critical applications. 
Dr. Christopher Iannello requested the NESC to investigate this effort.  The rationale to support 
this approach as indicated in the NESC request is discussed in this report along with some 
considerations and comments by the NESC Avionics Technical Discipline Team (TDT).  The 
out-of-board activity was approved by the NESC Review Board on February 16, 2012.  
The key stakeholders for this assessment are the NESC and the CCP. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
NASA's Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is stimulating efforts within the private sector to 
develop and demonstrate safe, reliable, and cost-effective space transportation capabilities.  One 
initiative involves investigating the use of commercial electronic parts.  NASA's CCP asked the 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to collect data to help frame the technical, cost, 
and schedule risk trades associated with electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts 
selection and specifically expressed desire of some of the CCP partners to employ EEE parts of a 
lower grade than traditionally used in most NASA safety-critical applications.  The original 
request to the NESC is provided in Appendix A. 
The NASA Avionics Technical Fellow and members of the Technical Discipline Team (TDT) 
responded with comments to the CCP provider’s stated rationale for use of commercial parts 
(refer to Section 6).  The NESC team also responded to the specific analytical support requests 
(refer to Section 7). 
The fundamental question posed is can commercial off-the-shelf EEE parts with limited 
screening be used in crewed flight hardware systems? 
The term “commercial off-the-shelf parts,” or “COTS,” is broadly defined and not applied 
consistently.  The medical, automotive, aviation, and some consumer electronics manufacturers 
are termed commercial users.  However, these industries frequently employ supply chain 
controls to assure the quality and reliability of the EEE parts used in their products.  At the other 
end of the spectrum are commercial catalog parts that have not been subjected to any testing 
other than functionality. 
The NESC team reviewed and analyzed approaches based on screening parts only through box- 
or system-level testing and concluded that there are fundamental concerns with the rationale 
(Section 6).  The approach is based on procuring commercial parts as received from a distributor 
without qualification for space or additional screening, and assembling them on circuit boards. 
Such an approach would result in assembling good parts along with any weak parts, parts with 
latent defects, and infant mortals into flight hardware with the assumption that board-, box-, and 
system-level testing can effectively identify parts that might fail during the anticipated mission 
lifetime. 
The team concluded that board-, box-, and system-level testing cannot replicate accelerating 
factors that voltage, current, and temperature stresses provide during part-level screening 
(Section 6.0.1).  The traditional approach of eliminating non-conforming parts through 
screening, prior to board installation, has consistently proven effective.  Established screening 
approaches applied at some point along the supply chain identifies defects and abnormalities that 
are not intended features of the device design, and serve as warning signs of premature failure, 
reduced performance and safety.  Once a part failure occurs, effective two-way traceability of 
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commercial parts is necessary to identify the origin of the failed part and location of other similar 
defective parts within the system.  
Qualification is essential to assure the part technology, design, and construction is capable of 
predictable and required performance in the space environment.  Qualification can expose parts 
that function properly in terrestrial applications but may not perform safely in the more extreme 
space radiation, vacuum, vibration, and thermal environments. 
NASA has successfully used commercial parts in spacecraft for specific and sometimes mission 
critical applications throughout the Agency’s history.  This has been achieved by careful 
selection, qualification, and screening.  The level of screening required of commercial parts to 
assure they will work successfully is highly dependent on the mission, their application, and part 
technology and is quite well characterized in existing NASA parts documents such as EEE-
INST-002.  NASA flies non-MIL parts when the required functionality and or performance is not 
available in MIL parts.  If a MIL part can be used, they are preferred. 
The NESC team responded to specific questions asked by the CCP Program.  Initial qualitative 
analysis by the NESC team indicates significant differences in reliability and safety can result 
between screened MIL parts and unscreened commercial parts (Section 7).  Differences are 
highly influenced by mission duration, system architecture, including the selection of like or 
diverse backup systems. 
Automotive, commercial aviation, medical, and safety conscious consumer electronics industries 
engage in assurance processes within their supply chain to identify weak parts, parts with latent 
defects, and infant mortals before assembling them into critical applications.  The NESC team 
found no data from any industry or agency supporting delivery of safety critical systems with 
unscreened parts procured from distributors. 
The team concluded that any alternative approach for the use of COTS EEE parts in critical 
applications other than those which have proved successful, such as described in EEE-INST-002 
or similar NASA documents, requires a firm basis for substantiation (Section 7).  Any approach, 
which is based on architectural similar redundancy and box-level testing, has been studied by the 
NESC team and shown to not be sufficient to enable widespread use of unscreened parts 
acquired from distributors in critical applications. 
To reduce the likelihood that parts failures result in unacceptable mission risk, the NESC 
recommends the CCP require vehicle providers to: 1) develop and implement a top-down 
mission assurance program to address EEE parts derating, qualification, traceability, and 
counterfeit control, and demonstrate how it mitigates the risks associated with EEE parts 
applications, and 2) provide data supporting the effectiveness of the proposed screening 
approach assuring part failure rates are adequately bounded.  Section 8 of this paper provides 
insight into some of the major characteristics of a parts assurance program. 
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5.0 It is About Assurance  
Ultimately, selection of an electronics parts and supply chain management program is driven by 
assurance principles.  Assuring the parts perform as intended and as expected is critical not only 
to complete mission objectives but, most importantly, for human-rated missions, returning the 
crew safely to Earth.  
There is no a priori prescription for low-risk electronics.  Even a Grade 1 Class “S” parts 
program can be defeated by improper parts application and stress issues rooted in design or 
unforeseen vibration and thermal environmental interactions with parts assembled on the board. 
A sound assurance program for low-risk electronics is grounded in a careful top-down 
assessment of mission risk drivers.  Top-down systems engineering identifies and attacks the 
highest risk (weakest links) whether induced by EEE parts or non-electrical items such as weak 
risers or attach bolts for the parachute.  An assurance program “assures” the actual hardware is 
designed with margin and is built and performs as intended.   
The duration of critical functions can vary widely from a single 2-hour-long use to multiple reuse 
capsules with 6 months or longer on orbit stay times, which has a major influence on risk.  
EEE parts assurance starts with the mission and the operational sequence that defines the 
environment, duration, and how the system architecture protects the critical functions 
implemented in electronics.  Assurance involves not only the quality of the parts, but also their 
specific application and installation. 
To ensure that electronics failures do not become a significant risk driver overtaking the high 
risks in ascent propulsion and landing systems, including parachutes requires careful 
consideration of system architecture, backup systems, and the assurance program.  
From an overall mission perspective, one strategy might suggest the biggest contributors to 
mission risk should result in the best that can be 
achieved with non-avionics system elements, such 
as crew life support, engines, entry thermal 
protection, and landing systems.  In other 
words, electronics should not surface as a 
mission risk driver.  Established techniques 
can dramatically improve the reliability of 
electronics; however, there are limited ways to 
dramatically improve the reliability of non-
electrical elements, such as parachutes.  
Assuring electronics risk does not drive mission risk by more than 1 to 10 percent implies 
electronics is at least 10 if not 100 times less of a contributor to overall mission risk than non-
electronics elements.  Figure 5.0-1 shows how a notional 1 in 200 non-electrical probability of 
Figure 5.0-1. Notional Non-Electrical and Electrical 
Failure Rate Contributors to Loss of Mission 
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failure combines with a 1 in 20,000 rate to result in a system failure of 1 in 198.  In this example, 
the electrical system degrades the predicted mission failure rate by 1 percent. 
The term “commercial off the shelf parts” or “COTS” is broadly defined and not applied 
consistently.  Often the medical, automotive, commercial aviation, and some consumer 
electronics industries are labeled as commercial.  These industries often control their supply 
chain.  Because their products such as cars or cell phones are sold to consumers does not mean 
they use commercially available parts without controlling their source or subjecting their supply 
chain to some kind of qualification or screening program.  On the other hand, other 
commercially-available consumer parts do not follow any specific qualification or screening 
processes. 
A qualitative assessment showing the system effects of parts quality can be achieved by 
applying relative failure rate factors described in Table 5.0-1.  The table compares the definition 
of parts grades and identifies a relative parts failure rate factor that can be used to compare parts 
programs.  These factors can be obtained from the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging 
(NEPP)1.  Fundamentally it indicates: Grade 2 active parts are four times more likely to fail than 
Grade 1 parts; screened MIL-883 parts are eight times more likely to fail than Grade 1 parts; 
unscreened commercial parts 40 times more likely than Grade 1, or 10 times more likely than 
Grade 2.  By their nature, these relative failure rates are not meant to be precise nor applicable to 
all parts.  Data supporting the approximate value of the relative failures rates is presented in 
Appendix B.  
This comparison shows the relative value of screening and production line control programs.  
The actual parts used from Grade 1 and commercial categories may perform and potentially last 
the same, but the difference lies in the uncertainty of the higher bound of the failure rate as 
shown in Figure 5.0-2.  Without screening, commercial parts with unknown defects could have 
variable failure rates peaking over 40 times higher than a baseline Level 1 Established Reliability 
part type with quantified known failure rates.  This risk is compounded by the clustering nature 
of EEE parts failure modes; that is, it is common to observe parts failures clustered around a 
manufacturing lot or specific time/facility. 
 
  
                                                 
1 https://nepp.nasa.gov/nepag/info/parts_risk_matrix.htm 
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Table 5.0-1. Comparison of Reliability Factors and Parts Grade (adapted from NEPP1) 
  NPSL Level 1, 
Class S or 
975 Grade 1 
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975 Grade 2 
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Figure 5.0-2.  Notional Parts Failure Rate and Uncertainty about Median 
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6.0 Review of Commercial Crew Provider Rationale for using 
Commercial Parts 
According to the NESC request (refer to Appendix A), at least one CCP partner expressed an 
interest in using parts procured from a commercial online distributor using the industrial grade 
(due to desired performance over expanded temperature range compared to commercial grade), 
and to perform little to no screening or testing on the component at the piece part-level before 
installation on the board or assembly.  The rationale to support this approach, as indicated in the 
NESC request, is listed below in italics along with some considerations and comments by the 
NESC Avionics TDT: 
1.  Extensive testing at the board and box-level equates to some portion of the testing required 
to be classified as a higher grade part. 
Board-level testing is far less perceptive than part-level testing in identifying weak parts 
susceptible to premature failure.  Furthermore, board- and box-level testing does not 
necessarily demonstrate part-level performance margin.  Board- and box-level testing is 
valuable to verify overall functional performance and to identify gross functional failures 
induced by assembly defects. 
Board testing cannot screen for each part's parametric performance and stability at a part’s 
design limit.  Part-level testing is most perceptive in identifying the weak parts by exercising 
the part at voltage, current, temperature extremes, and other environmental factors not 
possible at the board level.  A board can function during test, but have near zero margin due 
to circuit design flaws and/or a latent part flaws and this would go undetected.  Margin 
against unexpected environmental conditions makes for a robust design.  
A box-level elevated temperature burn-in does not screen for failure modes not activated in a 
way predicted by the Arrhenius behavior.  Some failure modes are activated and accelerated 
when parts operate closer to voltage and current limits and such conditions are often not 
possible in circuits at higher levels of integration.  The lowest part rating on the board limits 
the allowable temperature excursion to preclude overstress. 
Reliability models such as MIL-HDBK-217 are based on the Arrhenius theory that part 
degradation mechanisms such as internal corrosion due to contamination approximately 
double in rate every 10 degrees centigrade and on an assumption that system reliability is 
predictable because parts fail from wear-out.  It is the NESC team’s experience that most part 
failures are from defects introduced by manufacture or handling, from misapplication, or 
from design flaws and not from wear-out mechanisms, such as semiconductor die metal 
migration or oxide layer thinning over time. 
Uncontrolled manufacturing design changes and uncontrolled construction of the die could 
affect performance near operational limits (e.g., voltage, temperature, current, propagation 
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delay, etc.) or under total dose and single event upset radiation environment.  See item 4 
below for further discussions about uncontrolled manufacturing process changes. 
2. Their architecture, which is dual failure tolerance at the system-level as well as internal to 
the avionics boxes, is robust to failures. 
Robustness implies a predictable response under unanticipated or unknown failure 
mechanisms and thus provides the ability to continue the mission.  Robustness would 
depend on board/system architecture, whether the failure cause/mechanism is generic, and 
whether the mission is long enough for multiple failures to occur.  
Multiple strings can defend against random failures, but the NESC team’s experience is that 
most failures are not truly random in nature.  Many failure causes are correlated to multiple 
parts within a lot.  Part- or board-level manufacturing processes or handling can introduce 
latent defects in multiple parts.  Also, common environments such as radiation, thermal, and 
vibration can cause failures across all strings over time (i.e., common cause failures (CCF)). 
Robustness involves margin to physical limits. Without testing of parts at or near their 
operational limits, little is known about the parts margin in circuit.  Robustness also involves 
application of the parts in a manner providing margin to data sheet limits (derating) so the 
system can survive unexpected or unforeseen events.  
3. The overall increase in failure rates given these lower grade parts, when this 3-string 
architecture is considered, does not appreciably increase loss of crew (LOC) or loss of 
mission (LOM). 
When the electrical elements do not appreciably affect the overall system reliability (less 
than about 1 percent), it implies the electrical system is about 100 times less likely to fail 
than the non-electrical elements.  However, examining a notional system indicates that 
commercial parts failure rates (see Table 5.0-1) could have a dramatic impact on the total 
system failure probability for missions 2 weeks in duration or longer.  Mission duration is a 
big driver in these results and poor quality parts can drive risk in the electrical elements far 
above the non-electrical with significant impact to the total system failure rate.  See Section 
7.2. 
4. The use of commercial parts means a greater part selection with more nimble part lines 
which generate higher performing parts (higher millions of instructions per second (MIPS), 
lower resistances drain to source (when) on (RDSon), etc.), which offsets failure rates as 
performance margin is increased.  
Higher performance does not necessarily equate to a reliability improvement.  Higher 
performance is most often functional and not measured against margin to environmental 
stresses that affect the part in the system, such as its susceptibility to electrostatic discharge 
(ESD), transients, or radiation damage.  Higher performing parts could exhibit higher failure  
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rates in a real system.  For example, higher performance and higher speed parts with smaller 
feature sizes or thinner oxides might be more susceptible to ESD, transients, or radiation 
damage.  There is some anecdotal evidence indicating that reliability is worse because 
reduced feature sizes result in reduced operating margins to time-dependent physics of failure 
limits (e.g., electromigration, and dielectric breakdown).2  
Nimble part manufacturing lines allow a manufacturer to meet changing market demands.  
These changes can affect manufacturing locations, facilities, materials, processes, and 
procedures.  These, in turn, can unintentionally worsen performance relative to 
environmental factors not covered by typical data sheets, such as susceptibility to radiation 
damage.  Without source control drawings or other techniques to manage the supply chain, 
parts changes can affect system reliability. 
Nimble or uncontrolled part lines can lead to changes in parts or discontinuance and 
replacement making the original electronics design that relied on them obsolete (parts 
obsolescence). 
5. In addition to performance, their designs can employ newer technologies not available in the 
Class S Grade 1 versions. 
New technology can be a benefit if it results in a significantly simpler system with fewer 
parts or less complexity, less power, and cooler operation.  However, newer technology 
comes with risks and unexplored problems.  For example, the newer RDSon field effect 
transistors (FETs) also bring with this change the possibility of thermal runaway when 
applied in circuits requiring operation in the linear region for periods longer than 10 
milliseconds3. 
6. The obvious gains in schedule and cost trades. 
Programmatic gains in schedule or cost do not necessarily correlate to improved reliability or 
safety relative to the parts assurance program and can completely evaporate in a single 
anomaly and recovery.  A paper written by Sampson and Plante4 describes the Goddard 
Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) experience with cost drivers on parts programs. 
 
  
                                                 
2
 Does Silicon Wearout: An OEM’s Perspective, Dr. C. Hillman; http://www.ewh.ieee.org/r6/scv/rl/articles/Does%20Silicon%20Wearout.pdf 
3 Problem Advisory Linear Mode Application, Power MOSFET #FV5-P-09-01A, 23 April 2009 
4 Cost Impacts Due to Electronic Part Upgrading for Use in NASA Programs, Jeannette Plante, Dynamic Range Corporation, Michael J. 
Sampson, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 3/6/2003 
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7.0 Response to Commercial Crew Program Specific Requests of 
the NESC 
The original request, provided in Appendix A, asked for answers to the questions shown in 
italics below.  Responses to the questions by the NESC Avionics TDT are provided following 
the request/questions. 
1. Provide back to the CCP Engineering leadership a benchmark on EEE parts selection 
criteria from commercial aviation large and small (Boeing-Seattle and Cessna or 
equivalents).  It is understood that the mission duration as well as natural and induced 
environments are different.  However, this data point may help program decision-makers 
frame this risk. 
Various industries use different approaches.  Aircraft, automotive, and some consumer 
electronics industries typically apply supply chain management processes to assure the parts 
built into the end product are of the quality needed to perform their intended function and 
mission.  In other words, they have an assurance program with parts vendors.  The NESC 
team looked at aviation and automotive approaches.  The CCP team can perform further 
research of supply chain management and assurance processes for other industries. 
Automotive Industry. The automotive industry has an extensive supply management 
program and relationship with their suppliers as do some, but not all, consumer electronics 
suppliers.  Commercial industries typically give emphasis to parts quality and changes 
because of the impacts of recalls and warranty returns.  Parts are often purchased to a source 
control drawing with a unique part number, and are purchased directly from the manufacturer 
or for commodity items such as simple passive resistors or capacitors at least from a 
manufacturer’s authorized supplier.  Monitoring of suppliers and restrictions on approved 
suppliers is common.  The automotive industry uses a Production Part Approval Process 
(PPAP5).  EEE parts suppliers have special processes to meet the requirements for the 
automotive industry.  Manufacturers take supply chain management seriously.  Not only do 
they assure the quality of the parts, they also actively monitor their supplier's business health.  
They perform "design failure modes and effects analysis (FMEAs)" and "production process 
FMEAs" to identify potential ways faulty parts might enter their end item products. 
2. Commercial Aviation.  The Federal Aviation Administration predicts the number of 
commercial aircraft to grow from 7,816 in 2007 to 12,202 in 2025.  As a result, the Boeing 
Company and Airbus, have reported that only those avionics suppliers with an International  
 
                                                 
5 http://www.aiag.org/staticcontent/quality/index.cfm The Automotive Industry Action Group, also known as 
AIAG, manages the Production Part Approval Process (PPAP) standards. 
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Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) certified Electronic Component Management Plan 
(ECMP) need apply.  IEC Technical Specification (TS) 62239 provides a standard format in 
which suppliers can document processes, including part selection, application and 
qualification, quality assurance, dependability, as well as data and obsolescence 
management.  Boeing and Airbus have notified supply chain associates that starting with 
their 787 and A350 models, respectively, suppliers must comply with the IEC TS 62239 
standard for the preparation of an ECMP.  These plans are critical to assuring the reliability, 
sustainability, and suitability of the COTS electronic components used in today’s avionics 
systems.6Given a generic architecture with dual redundancy across all elements, an 
assumption that common parts exist in each string, a typical division of LOC/LOM allocation 
to avionics, can move from Grade 1/Class S parts to Commercial/Industrial parts with no 
upscreen really have little effect on overall LOC/LOM?  A notional analysis is requested to 
assess this assertion. 
This question is difficult to answer with any meaningful accuracy or precision.  There is 
neither a “generic architecture” nor is there a “typical division” of failure rate between 
electronics and non-electronics.  There is also no all-encompassing generic mission profile 
that includes natural and induced 
environments. 
One strategy is to guide the 
electronics design to a 
failure rate of less than 
1/10th of the non-electrical 
system elements, such as 
the parachutes, heat shield, 
and engines.  In this case, 
the system reliability is not 
markedly improved with 
improvements in the 
electronics reliability.  As the failure rates of the electronics approaches 1/10 of the non-
electrical, the total system failure rate dramatically increases as shown in the table and plots 
below. 
A notional electronics architecture that is used for the relative comparisons is shown in 
Figure 7.2-1.  It consists of 24 cross-strapped series system elements (avionics boxes) each 
with a baseline failure rate of 2-6 per hour assuming a Grade 1 Class S parts program.  The 
                                                 
6 Distribution Insider, An Industry Guide to Electronics Supply and Demand, Commercial Aviation Needs a Plan, 2009. 
Figure 7.2-1.  Notional Electronics System Architecture:  
3 Cross-Strapped Strings of 24 Boxes 
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origination of the 24 boxes and the selection of a typical average failure rate was detailed in 
the NESC’s Smart Buyer study7. 
Figure 7.2-2 notionally shows how parts grade can affect system failure probability.  The 
source of the relative parts failure rate is the NASA NEPP1 summarized in Table 7.2-1 and 
Table 7.2-2.  The floor of the plot is set to a constant 0.5 percent representing a 1-in-200 
chance of the non-electrical system elements failure.  The failure rate of the non-electrical 
system is driven by items, such as parachutes, heat shields, and engines.  In this notional 
example the electrical system failure rate adds to the non-electrical.  
As shown in the figure, a triple redundant system with 24 cross strapped elements built with 
Grade 1 or Class S parts on a 6-month mission contributes 1:66,000 to the overall failure 
probability, degrading the total system from 1:200 to about 1:198.  For an electrical system to 
degrade the total system by only 1 percent the electrical elements would need less than a 
1:20,000 failure probability as shown in Figure 7.2-2.  
Class B parts with a 4x Class S failure rate contribute more to the system failure probability, 
but remain less than the non-electrical portion as shown in Figure 7.2-2.  The use of MIL-883 
parts with an 8x Class S failure rate, when used in the team’s notional system, exceeds the 
non-electrical failure rate significantly (1:140 vs. 1:200), driving the total system failure rate 
to 1:84, thus increasing the total system risk (see Table 7.2-1).  Use of unscreened 
commercial parts with failure rates larger than 883 parts (the rate 40 is times higher than 
Class S parts, per Table 5.0-1) results in dramatically higher failure probabilities as the plot 
in Figure 7.2-2 shows. 
Acquiring commercial parts without an assurance program could result in large uncertainty 
bars in failure rates, Figure 5.0-2.  MIL Established Reliability (ER) parts have data that 
substantiates their failure rates.  Without screening data or an assurance program, there might 
be little confidence in any type of numerical analysis.  Commercial parts could perform as 
well as a Class “S” part or they could fail prematurely due to “walking wounded” escapes not 
caught in board- or box-level testing waiting for the right combination of voltage, 
temperature, mechanical, or operational conditions to fail.  Lastly, many flight failures have 
occurred due to excessive stresses introduced by either the design, or manufacturing and test 
processes, or interactions with the specific environment or mission profile that are not 
anticipated by a failure rate analysis or probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) rather than 
wearout. 
  
                                                 
7 Crew Exploration Vehicle “Smart Buyer” Design Team Final Report, May 2006, section 4.1.4.1 page 182. Copies of the report can be 
requested  from the NESC. 
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Figure 7.2-2.  Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 24-Element, 3-String X-Strap Electronics System 
versus Parts Grade for 6 Months 
 
Table 7.2-1.  Failure Probability at 6 Months for a Hypothetical 24-Element, 3-String X-Strap 
Electronics System versus Parts Grade 
  Failure Rate 1:n Flights 
  Electrical Non- Electrical Total System 
Electrical Contribution 1% of Total for 1:200 1:20,000 1:200 1:198 
Electrical Contribution 1/10 of Non-Electrical 1:2,000 1:200 1:182 
“Notional” System Results: 6 Months Electrical Non- Electrical Total System 
Baseline Failure Rate Class S 1:65,400 1:200 1:199 
4x Failure Rate Class B 1:1,060 1:200 1:169 
8x Failure Rate Mil-883 1:140 1:200 1:84 
40x Failure Rate COTS 1:2 1:200 1:2 
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Figure 7.2-3. Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 24-Element, 3-String X-Strap Electronics System 
Powered Down After 2 Weeks versus Parts Grade 
 
Table 7.2-2. Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 3-String X-Strap Electronics System Powered Down 
After 2 Weeks versus Parts Grade 
 Failure Rate 1:n Flights 
 Electrical Non- Electrical Total System 
“Notional” System Results: 6 months, 
powered off after 2 weeks 
   
Baseline Failure Rate Class S 1: (1:>1,000,000) 1:200 1:200 
4x Failure Rate Class B 1:186,000 1:200 1:200 
8x Failure Rate ”MIL-883” 1:23,500 1:200 1:198 
40x Failure Rate COTS 1:200 1:200 1:101 
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3. Given failure rates collected in Grade 2 upscreens (particle impact noise detection (PIND), 
X-ray, burn-in, etc.) and data from manufacturers and the field centers, can this assessment 
team recommend an upscreen/testing regime that would improve the analysis in two such 
that the LOC/LOM with commercial grade parts approaches that calculated when Grade 2 
(Class B, etc.) parts are used? 
Screening of commercial parts to meet Grade 2 parts program requirements is described in 
several sources including EEE-INST-002.  Upscreening commercial parts often results in 
increased costs over procuring Grade 2 parts from the outset4.  
In general, there are not sufficient screening failure rate statistics easily available to 
accurately and quantitatively characterize the different defect rates among the different parts 
grades.  However, there are some qualitative indications.  
The team’s GSFC experience is that few lots fail the percent defective allowable (PDA) 
limit, which is 10 percent for Level 2 and 5 percent for Level 1.  PDA is the total number of 
failures allowed from pre-burn-in to post-burn-in electrical.  The first indication for a “bad” 
lot is exceeding its PDA.  Commercial lots, which have never been screened, fail PDA more 
often than MIL parts on a manufacturer’s Established Reliability product line.  Rarely do 
ceramic/metal hermetic, 883 type parts suffer lot failures, since most have already seen some 
level of screening. 
When requested at time of purchase, attribute data including screening fallout is supplied 
with a lot of military grade parts.  Military grade part procurements are typically limited to a 
certificate of compliance.  The customer does not receive attributes data for commercial parts 
and Certificates of Compliance generally lack proper traceability.  
There are significant differences in acceptance criteria between commercial and military 
grade parts leading up to lot qualification and successful destructive physical analysis (DPA).  
These differences can lead to lot failures in commercial parts that are caused by problems 
that have been screened from lots of military parts.   
Additional testing of commercial parts after their receipt subjects the parts to additional 
handling.  There is considerable expense to develop test fixturing and Automated Test 
Equipment software for the purposes of screening and qualifying lower grade parts.  There is 
also the possibility of electrical and/or mechanical overstresses (such as ESD or cracked 
hermetic seals, etc.) due to all the additional handling during the various tests.  Often, the 
total cost is far higher than the difference in piece part cost between commercial and military 
grades. 
Often manufacturer's “warranties” of commercial parts are voided by screening.  In some 
cases, the temperature range had to be reduced to accommodate the limited temperature 
limits acceptable to the lot.  The manufacturer does not guarantee shifts in performance 
parameters if the screening temperature exceeds their recommend operational temperature 
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range.  Typically, the plastic encapsulated microcircuit (PEM) devices are rated from 0C to 
70C.  However, to qualify them for spaceflight environments, the test exposure needs to range 
from -55C to 85C or 125C.  The encapsulation of plastic devices is getting better so the gap 
between using ceramic versus plastic parts is reducing.  However, projects still have to deal 
with delamination and possible ionic contamination, depending on control of the cleaning 
process. 
Hybrid and multichip modules introduce additional risk into electronic systems if the 
components and assembly techniques are not controlled.  The issue is that post-assembly 
tests cannot assure quality or long-term reliability since production quantities are smaller.  
Assembly techniques such as die/parts placement, soldering, and wire bonding should be 
verified.  Also, individual components cannot be stressed as they would if they were screened 
before assembly into the module.  Examples of such devices are hybrid direct current to 
direct current (DC/DC) converters, solid-state power switches, analog to digital (A/D) 
converters, and stacked memory modules. 
Some noteworthy qualitative differences between commercial and high reliability military 
parts based on team experience are listed in Table 7.2-3.  Screened military parts and 
unscreened commercial parts are potentially different.  It is up to the program to explore such 
differences, understand what the differences might mean to safety and reliability, and then 
defend against those undesired effects.  Defenses could range from obviating the risk, diverse 
backups, or different parts. 
a. Please provide a primer of parts grades and associated testing of each along with an 
assessment of what tests provide the greatest value. 
The NESC team’s opinion is that no single prescription or single approach will provide an 
optimum answer for all parts in a complex system composed of safety critical and non-
critical functions.   
The NESC team recommends that the parts program be engineered, planned, and 
implemented in concert with a top-down mission assurance program.  Resources, such as 
EEE-INST-002, provide a source for the various parts screening activities.  
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Table 7.2-3. General Comparison of MIL versus COTS EEE Parts for High Reliability Applications 
Parts Characteristic 
 
Parts Quality Spectrum 
Space / MIL Unscreened Commercial 
In
te
nd
ed
 U
se
 
High Volume No Yes 
Harsh Environment? Yes Maybe to No 
Radiation Environments Yes (if required) No to rarely 
Extreme Temperatures Yes Maybe to No 
Temp Cycling Yes Maybe (but usually to lower levels than MIL) 
Vibration/Shock Yes Sometimes 
Vacuum Pressure Yes No 
Long-Life Yes No (warranty 6 mos  to 2 years)? 
Failure Rates Tolerated Very Low Significantly >> than MIL 
Suitable for Mission Critical Applications Usually Rarely to Maybe to No 
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
Specification Controlled By… MIL Supplier (usually) 
Penalties for non-compliance…? Yes -- Fraud/Fines/Jail No  
Product Lifetime (Obsolescence) Many Years to Decades 
Usually very short  
(months to few years) 
Extensive Variety of Products? Few Many 
Price Medium to High Low to Very Low 
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
User knowledge of internal construction? Yes, controlled Rarely 
Lot Homogeneity? Yes Varies 
Designs Very Stable, Conservative Margins Supplier Controlled, Aggressive Margins 
Materials Very Stable, Conservative Margins Supplier Controlled, Aggressive Margins 
Processes Very Stable, Conservative Margins Supplier Controlled, Aggressive Margins 
Size Bigger Smaller 
Weight Heavier Lighter 
Changes to Design/Materials/Process MIL-monitored 
Supplier controls changes,  
May vary frequently 
Te
st
in
g 
"Established Reliability?" Available for Passives and some actives No 
Screening MIL controlled, High Levels Supplier Controlled, Limited Insight 
Qualification MIL controlled, High Levels Supplier Controlled, Limited Insight 
Requalification MIL controlled, High Levels Supplier Controlled, Limited Insight 
Harsh Environment? MIL controlled, High Levels Not typically designed for harsh environments 
D
ev
ic
e 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
Functionality Lower Higher 
Speed Lower Higher 
M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s Manufacturing facility location known? Yes, controlled Possibly Yes, but often No 
Govt Audits? Yes (typically 2 to 3 year cycle) No 
Support with Problem Investigations? Yes No 
Potential for Counterfeiting Lower Higher 
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4. How does the short mission durations play into the analysis above and does the analysis 
support a different answer between launch vehicle and spacecraft? 
The details of the mission are a significant driver.  Mission durations of 2 hours, 2 weeks, 
and 6 months yield dramatically different results.  Using the notional three-string cross-
strapped system architecture described above, 2-hour missions are not significantly affected 
by parts quality; however, 6-month missions are significantly affected.  In addition to 
mission length, the configuration of the electronics drives the system failure rates.  For a  
6-month mission, failure rates are dramatically reduced if the electronics is powered down 
after 2 weeks should the system be docked to the International Space Station (ISS) for the 
remaining 5-½ months as shown in Figure 7.2-3.  Compare the Figure 7.2-3 power down 
case to the powered for 6-month case shown in Figure 7.2-2.  For this notional example, a 
failure rate of 1/10 the powered failure rate is assumed while powered down.   
See Table 7.2-4, Table 7.2-5, and Figure 7.2-4. 
 
Table 7.2-4.  Progression of Failure Probability Considering Mission Length for a Hypothetical  
24-Element, 3-String X-Strap Electronics System versus Parts Grade 
 Notional System Level Failure Rate 1:n missions (1:n Electronics Failure Rate) assuming a 1:200 
non-electrical failure rate in series 
Mission 
Class S 
Baseline Failure Rate 
Class B 
4x Failure Rate 
MIL-883 
8x Failure Rate 
COTS 
40x Failure Rate 
2 hours 1:200  (1:>>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:>>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:>>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:>1,000,000) 
2 weeks 1:200  (1:>>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:270,000) 1:184  (1:2,200) 
6 months, unpowered 
after 2 weeks 
1:200  (1:>1,000,000) 1:200  (1:186,000) 1:198  (1:23,500) 1:101    (1:200) 
6 months powered 1:199  (1:65,400) 1:169  (1:1,060) 1:84   (1:140) 1:2      (1:2) 
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Figure 7.2-4. Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 24-Element, 3-String X-Strap Electronics System 
for a 2-Week Mission versus Parts Grade 
 
Table 7.2-5.  Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 24-Element 3-String X-Strap Electronics System 
for a 2-Week Mission versus Parts Grade 
 Failure Rate 1:n Flights 
 Electrical Non- 
Electrical 
Total 
System 
“Notional” System Results: 2 
weeks 
   
Baseline Failure Rate Class S 1:>>1,000,000 1:200 1:200 
4x Failure Rate Class B 1:>1,000,000 1:200 1:200 
8x Failure Rate MIL-883 1:270,000 1:200 1:200 
40x Failure Rate COTS 1:2,200 1:200 1:184 
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5. How does (sic) CCFs play into the results? Given the likelihood of similar strings, and hence 
similar parts in similar lots across all the legs of redundancy, does common cause dominate 
the analysis results? 
A CCF leads to the system failing to perform its intended function due to a systematic fault 
in the design or implementation of a system, or a natural or induced stress leading to a 
premature failure of redundant elements within one mission lifetime.  Common stresses can 
include environments such as thermal, vibration, and radiation and/or electrical voltage or 
current stresses propagating from a single failure.  Since CCFs can affect multiple redundant 
elements in a system, the probability of CCFs can become the dominant factor in the overall 
probability of failure. 
A CCF occurs when a single fault or condition results in functional failures of multiple 
components.  CCFs are hard to predict and are driven by common environments encountered 
by redundant components during the mission, as well as manufacturing techniques and 
processes, handling, and other factors.  The frequency of CCFs is difficult to estimate.  
However, modern process-driven production techniques can introduce common failure 
modes or weaknesses into multiple copies of parts, boards, and electronics boxes.  The 
modeling techniques and available failure rate data make the predictive calculations of these 
failures cumbersome and the results obtained questionable. 
One of the simplest and most practical techniques to estimate CCFs is the beta factor, β, 
approach.  This approach assumes that the total failure rate of a system is composed of a 
random or independent failure rate plus a common cause or dependent failure rate, λtotal = 
λindependent + λcommon cause.  The β factor is used to calculate the CCF rate λcommon cause = β * 
λindependent. 
The modeling technique used for the notional example utilizes the β factor to represent the 
conditional probability that if one component fails, other like components will fail and is 
modeled as an element in series with a parallel set of redundant components as shown in 
Figure 7.2-5.  
Figure 7.2-5. System Diagram Showing Random and CCFs 
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The series element titled as R1 CC represents the redundant element #1 CCF probability.  
Three β factors, low medium and high, are compared in Table 7.2-6.  The β factors consider 
the probability of the first string failure also causing a second string failure and then the 
probability of the second string failure also causing the third string failure.  For the low β of 
3-6, 1 out of every 333 thousand failures of one element also results in the failure of all three.  
It was assumed that 1 out of 1000 failures (0.1 percent) of the first string failures also cause 
the second string to fail and then 3 out of 1000 second string failures (0.3 percent) also cause 
the third string to fail.  For the medium β of 300-6, it was assumed that 1 out of 100 failures 
(1 percent) of the first string also causes the second string to fail and then 3 out of 100 
seconds string failures (3 percent) cause the third string to fail.  For the high β of 3,000-6, it 
was assumed that 3 out of 100 failures (3 percent) of the first string also cause the second 
string to fail and then 10 out of 100 second string failures (10 percent) also cause the third 
string to fail. 
In the simple notional example shown in Figure 7.2-6 and Table 7.2-6, common cause is not 
the major driver when considering unscreened COTS parts with a factor of 40 increase in 
random failure rate.  The inherent failure rate of the parts themselves for the mission duration 
predominates.  However, for high reliability parts the system failure rate does depend on the 
CCFs.  For the low β factor there is little effect even for the high reliability Level 1 parts.  
Medium β results in more significant effects in the high reliability Level 1 parts.  However, a 
parts failure rate factor of 40 for the unscreened COTS is large and dominates even the 
higher common cause β factors. 
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Table 7.2-6.  Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 3-String X-Strap Electronics System with Various 
CCF Rates versus Parts Grade over a 6-Month Mission 
 
  
 System Failure Rate 1:n  (Electronics Failure Rate 1:n Flights)  
assuming 1:200 non electronics failure rate 
“Notional” System Results:  Baseline: No CCF Low β = 3-6  Medium β =  300-6 High β =  3,000-6 
Baseline Failure Rate Class S 1:199 (1:65,400) 1:199 (1:62,900) 1:197 (1:12,900) 1:178 (1:1,580) 
4x Failure Rate Class B 1:168   (1:1,060) 1:168    (1:1,060) 1:162      (1:844) 1:119     (1:296) 
8x Failure Rate MIL-883 1:82       (1:140) 1:82       (1:140) 1:80      (1:132) 1:59        (1:84) 
40x Failure Rate COTS 1:2          (1:2) 1:2          (1:2) 1:2          (1:2) 1:2          (1:2) 
Figure 7.2-6.  Failure Probability for a Hypothetical 24-Element 3-String X-Strap Electronics System with 
CCF of 1 percent for 2nd String and 3 percent for 3rd String versus Parts Grade over a 6-Month Mission 
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8.0 Can COTS EEE Parts Be Used in Flight Hardware Systems?  
In general, a parts assurance program guides proper control of risk through the design, derating, 
qualification, screening, implementation, and traceability of parts to ensure they will perform as 
intended.  Parts become flightworthy when they are a product of an assurance program targeted 
to control risk.  Table 8.0-1 identifies critical elements of a parts assurance program. 
Table 8.0-1.  Assurance Program Elements for Assuring Flightworthy Parts 
Elements Description 
Application (design 
& implementation) 
Proper in circuit use and protection from credible stresses induced by the mission’s natural and 
induced environments.  Protection from stresses resulting from failure propagation.  Proper 
implementation and assembly controlling stresses to electrical connections, thermal interface, and 
vibration loads. 
Derating Margin-to-maximum operating limits voltage, current, temperature, mechanical stresses to 
provide robustness against unexpected stresses, and extend service life. 
Qualification  Part design and manufacturer’s demonstrated ability to deliver a part consistently meeting part 
performance and operating range requirements consistent with the mission application. Assure the 
space, launch, and landing environments (including radiation, thermal, vibration, etc.) do not 
damage or destroy a part that functions properly on the ground.  Control of production process and 
limit unexpected consequences of manufacturer’s changes to part design or construction process. 
Screening Expose parts to safe electrical performance and environmental limits to accelerate the 
identification of infant mortals or weak parts with latent defects not possible through board and 
box- and system-level acceptance tests. 
Traceability Maintain record of the source of parts and where they are located within the electronics 
assemblies. Two-way traceability allows identification of the source of a suspect part and location 
of similar suspect parts. 
Counterfeit Control Prevent the introduction of inferior parts into electronics. Constrain parts to trusted sources. 
Ability to trace part back to qualified manufacturer. 
Some commercial part technologies that are acceptable for terrestrial use have inherent issues 
when exposed to the natural or induced space environment. According to published reports, the 
Phobos-Grunt mission failed "... due to non-space qualified parts being used in some of the 
electronics circuits."  "The Phobos-Grunt failure emphasizes the unforgiving nature of space 
exploration, where cutting corners in the spacecraft development, especially in testing, can be 
fatal."8  Good gel electrolyte capacitors if non-hermetic will dry out and fail in hard vacuum.  
Flying unsealed commercial batteries in space would be expected to yield similar results.  
Vacuum also typically causes parts to run hotter since there is loss of convection cooling.  Early  
                                                 
8 http://planetary.org/blog/article/00003361/ 
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fuse blowout on a satellite was observed after 9 months since the fuse elements were not 
sufficiently derated for vacuum use, and ran progressively hotter due to internal loss of air over 
time leading to open circuit of the fuse elements.  Vibration can cause issues with some parts 
technologies; examples being cPCI connector plating fretting and ball grid arrays solder joint 
cracking.  Radiation from both total dose and single event effects can be an issue for some part 
technologies.  Some parts fail from an integrated dose as low as 500 rads and a number of parts 
are susceptible to destructive single-event latchups and burnouts.  Some of these issues can be 
mitigated by hermetic packaging, derating, error detection and correction (EDAC), triple mode 
voting, etc., and some cannot. 
A proper control of risk to LOC must be grounded in a top-down assessment of critical functions 
necessary to accomplish the mission and safely return the crew to Earth.  Risk assessments must 
explore how commercial parts will perform their intended functions, understand EEE parts 
failure modes, understand system-level impacts should the parts fail at a higher rate, with clear 
understanding of risks to safe return of the crew, including criticality, likelihood, and 
uncertainty. 
It is the mission that dictates the environmental requirements, the application requirements 
(including criticality), and the time duration.  Thus, the selection of the EEE parts must ensure 
assurance of compliance to meet these requirements.  The environment, application, and overall 
mission time duration (including the time from the fabrication of the component, through testing, 
up to the end of life of the mission) in conjunction with an overall reliability analysis, hazard 
analysis, and FMEAs (or equivalent) will help the program decide which EEE parts grades are to 
be used.  
Any given part class has an uncertainty factor with respect to reliability, and quoted failure rates 
represent averages.  Unfortunately, many part failure modes are clustered in time and do not 
occur randomly over time, therefore the average rate is not an accurate estimate of the risk.  
When an EEE part’s undesirable failure mode is identified it is paramount for the parts assurance 
program to provide sufficient traceability to identify and remove other suspect parts.  The 
allowable mission risk and the system design will determine acceptable EEE parts grades and 
uncertainty in failure rates.  A part with higher uncertainty may be used in an application as long 
as the proper screening is performed on the given part thus reducing the uncertainty level though 
the detection and removal of outliers.  
The top-down assurance program must ensure that the entire mission-driven requirements  
(e.g., environmental, application, and time) and any other derived and/or additional requirements 
are met.  The following sections describe key characteristics of a parts assurance program. 
8.1  Part of an Established Top-Down Assurance Program  
For the Human Exploration Programs, it is important to understand the critical functions 
necessary to accomplish the mission of taking the crew into orbit, and/or the ISS or other 
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celestial body and returning the crew safely to Earth, and where proper operation of parts must 
be supported by test of margin to its limits.  For example, both the strength of parachute risers to 
survive transient loads and EEE parts’ capability to fire pyros or non-explosive actuators (NEA) 
under expected mission environments are important to returning the crew safely to Earth. 
In a constrained environment the assurance program should apply its resources where they are 
most effective.  This is only possible when the assurance program is guided by a top-down 
assessment of the critical functions and how they might fail and what defenses need to be in 
place.  
The top-down assurance program is also critical in controlling CCFs, such as cracked seals, or 
common electrical over-stresses such as ESD, wire bonding, contamination, etc.  
Mission-unique environmental effects including natural and induced thermal, mechanical, 
vibration and radiation are addressed in the assurance program.  Commercial parts especially 
those pushing the speed and low voltage envelope might be susceptible to radiation effects that 
are only discoverable by testing.  Commercial parts rarely if ever undergo total dose radiation or 
single-events effects testing. 
While not unique to commercial parts, failures are often due to problems associated with 
application and/or manufacturing issues (at component level as well as at system-level).  Adverse 
impacts to reliability can affect any parts program when insufficient derating or application 
issues exist.  Derating provides margin for unexpected interactions or other surprises.  Not only 
does derating promote long life, but also it allows the system to tolerate unexpected variances in 
voltage, current, or other critical parameters.  Parts stress analysis and worst case analysis backs 
up any parts program.  Engineers need to know where/when parts are being pushed to their 
margin or limits, and where/when margins are tight or robustness is low. 
Lastly, proper assembly techniques are required to avoid workmanship-related threats, such as 
those that can be caused by hand-soldering of surface mounted parts, etc. 
8.2  Mechanism to Confirm Parts Quality 
The EEE Parts Program must ensure that the selected components will meet the requirements 
necessary to accomplish mission objectives.  It is critical that the parts perform as intended and 
that failure rate assumptions used in risk assessments and reliability analysis is supported and 
bounded by testing.  
8.2.1 Control the Supply Chain through Qualification and Screening 
Electrical Performance and Electrical Integrity. The idea behind parts-level testing is to force 
out the failures early in the production flow by extremes at or near the limits (i.e., at a time where 
there is minimal investment in the part).  
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Part-level screening and burn-in removes the weak parts or beginning of life infant mortality 
assuring the failure rate of screened parts is in the flat portion of the bathtub curve assumed by 
the reliability analysis.  Proper screening would identify weak parts that fail prematurely, thus 
validating the reliability analysis.  Parts “screening testing” subjects parts to stresses close to 
their limits that most of the time cannot be duplicated at board- and box-levels.  Parts screening 
seeks to identify marginal parts that might fail prematurely. Testing at extremes or close to the 
limits ensures that weak ones close to the mean are also caught (i.e., including radiation test for 
the given mission environment).  
Testing at higher levels of integration, such as board- and box-level does not duplicate or replace 
part-level screening, but rather serves as functional and higher level performance verification 
with less extreme conditions and environments, which are typically limited by the lowest 
temperature component and the available supply voltage(s). 
Furthermore, parts can have significant flaws that are not detectable with the board-level test. 
Many parametric performance parameters do not matter at the board level, but they are indicative 
of a part destined to fail prematurely.  However, such weak parts that might fail prematurely are 
found in parts screening near their operational limits.  Box-level test therefore cannot duplicate 
the parts level screening.  
Procuring parts under a Source Control Drawing (SCD) can control parts quality especially for 
certain mission critical items.  SCDs can directly or indirectly control manufacturing processes 
that might introduce unintended or unexpected performance issues should production changes 
occur. 
Mechanical Integrity. EEE parts are typically available in many different type of packages, from 
ceramic, metal, glass, etc., to plastic encapsulated packages; different footprint and pin 
arrangements; different types of performing internal connections/bonding as well as the material 
used, such as gold, aluminum, internal and external coatings, etc.  Thus, it is important to 
understand the effect of manufacturing conditions may have on the given application.  
Furthermore, it is of extreme importance to understand and screen for typical manufacturing 
defects given the type of component and the manufacturing techniques/process used to produce 
the given component (i.e., cleaning processes that may introduce contaminants).  Screening 
techniques used to ensure the mechanical integrity of the EEE components include: X-ray 
(nondestructive test), DPA, bonding pull test, leak test, PIND test, humidity tests, etc.  
8.2.2 Defend Against Counterfeit Parts 
Low cost and poorly performing counterfeit parts are increasingly becoming a problem.  
Counterfeit parts can have dramatic effects on actual or perceived performance and reliability.  
Counterfeit parts may function in a circuit, but may not have the radiation tolerance or margin 
against limits.  The following links are provided for reference: 
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http://www.c-span.org/Events/Senate-Investigates-Counterfeit-Parts-in-Military-
Equipment/10737425339/ 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-08/china-counterfeit-parts-in-u-s-military-
boeing-l3-aircraft.html 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/07/us/u-s-military-bogus-parts/ 
Counterfeit parts might reduce reliability in unexpected ways and might affect multiple strings in 
an identical fashion (i.e., potentially leading to CCFs).  Identifying and controlling the 
unintended introduction of counterfeit parts requires a parts program that includes traceability 
and procuring parts directly from the manufacturer or authorized outlet, as well as a proper 
screening process. 
8.2.3 Accurate Assessment of Commercial Parts Failure Rates  
“Higher Performance Parts” often have lower margins between operational and failure limits.  
Modern computer-aided design (CAD) tools used by chip designers allow improved performance 
and reduced margins to limits.  This higher performance does not help reliability especially when 
margins to limits are reduced.  Higher performance can help with lower power/thermal stress or 
where offsetting reduction in complexity or parts occur.  Reducing margins is a byproduct of 
denser packaging, faster clock speeds resulting in smaller feature sizes, and lower supply 
voltages; such parts have reduced tolerance to voltage overstress and ESD.  
Manufacturers may publish their failure rates for what they expect are known good parts.  This is 
different than the defect rate that is typically unpublished.  Defects are typically found in clusters 
and during screening.  Removing the cluster of infant mortality failures has a significant impact 
on the average failure rate.  Without eliminating the weak parts through screening, parts could 
fail prematurely in-flight and can surface in clusters affecting multiple redundant strings. 
It is the NESC team’s experience that wear-out failures and truly random failures during life are 
quite rare.  Many parts failures for all grades of parts can be traced to excessive stresses induced 
by the design, construction, or the natural or induced environments. 
Know the threats introduced by low quality parts/components.  For example, the mechanical 
integrity of electrical connectors: insufficient gold-plating of commercial connectors (such as 
cPCI and others) could lead to serious electrical contact (intermittence) and/or contamination 
problems.  Typical commercial connectors have a lesser gold-plating on their respective 
pins/socket contacts than what NASA requires (50 micro-inch gold minimum).  Mating and de-
mating of these COTS connectors, including the effect of vibration, may wear off the plating of 
the related pins leading to potential electrical intermittence and/or contamination (e.g., potential 
electrical short, or contamination of critical sensors).  NASA requires 50 micro-inch of gold 
plating for these reasons for flight applications.  Connectors also can have a “press fit” design 
where a square pin is forced into a round hole, destroying the plated-through hole.   
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Perform evaluation of shelf or storage life. There is the potential for shelf-life issues due to how 
parts are stored.  Contamination and moisture can affect all parts in common ways.  Parts 
handling and storage must adhere to manufacturer-recommended storage and handling 
conditions.  A part’s package construction (including pin plating, hermeticity, etc.) can drive 
unique storage and handling needs.  
8.2.4  Manage Parts Obsolescence  
Level 1 through Level 3 (MIL) as well as commercial parts may become obsolete and may no 
longer be produced, although the pace of obsolescence is much more rapid for commercial parts 
in general.  Commercial parts are often part of a rapidly evolving line where the design or 
construction may frequently change as part of continuous process improvements.  Minor 
adjustments usually only require approval at the line organization level.  Major changes are 
carefully controlled but final approval is by the company’s internal change control procedure 
with concurrence possibly sought from major customers.  On the other hand, for military parts, 
major and minor changes are defined by the specifications and major changes require approval 
by the Qualifying Activity (Defense Logistics Agency, Land and Maritime), before introduction 
into the MIL qualified production process. As a minor customer, NASA gets no visibility into 
commercial process changes unless the manufacturer publicly issues a product change 
notification.  For space grade MIL parts, NASA is consulted on major changes and can provide 
recommendations to the QA regarding validation testing, process control requirements and final 
approval.  Even for non-space grade MIL parts, NASA usually has insight into significant 
process changes as NASA is afforded the same rights as a military service in the Defense 
Standardization Program.  Although product evolution is therefore slower for MIL parts than 
commercial, it gives NASA a lot more time to evaluate changes to reduce the risk for unintended 
consequences.  Changes made to commercial parts, which may have no negative impacts for the 
applications of their primary customers, can have serious impacts for NASA as radiation 
tolerance may be drastically reduced or electrical parameters may change in undesirable ways so 
the part may no longer perform properly in the original circuit.  As parts become obsolete and are 
replaced with newer parts, resulting design changes ripple into the circuit board and box design. 
These changes can adversely affect the total system not only from a performance perspective, but 
also from a producibility perspective.  The parts program should strive to minimize the chance of 
obsolescence from adversely affecting safety-critical systems. 
8.2.5  Identify Threatening Materials 
A mechanism is required to ensure that parts with pure tin coatings do not get into systems where 
tin whiskers could result in serious failures including failures in multiple strings.  Due to 
restriction of hazardous substances (RoHS) regulations mandating lead-free parts in Europe, 
many commercial parts are tin-coated.  Tin whisker threats need to be factored into the program 
given the potential for long shelf-life or storage on the ground and the potential for reuse and  
re-flight. 
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Materials such as silicone or nylon can pose an outgassing concern in space applications, but 
may not be a concern for a manned capsule.  It may be appropriate to screen and test materials in 
a crew cabin to assure compatibility with breathable atmosphere and control of fire hazards. 
Commercial plastic parts can absorb moisture that can destroy the part under elevated 
temperature and vacuum conditions. 
8.3 Establish a Plan to Identify and Recover from a Defective Lot 
A plan should be developed that deals with parts issues should they surface.  For example, if a 
particular capacitor has a generic issue, then what is the recovery strategy?  Is there a way to 
identify the capacitor’s source and where parts from the same source or lot may be installed?  If 
the commercial parts do not have traceability, then what can and will be done once defective 
parts are installed in electronics? 
The pedigree of any parts program is grounded in data capturing the parts history with sufficient 
fidelity to identify where the part originated and where similar defective parts might threaten the 
mission.  Commercial parts give up traceability and therefore the user does not know when and 
where the parts were made.  If a bad commercial lot is found, without some kind of two-way 
traceability, it may not be possible to replace all instances of the generic part to preserve the 
intended reliability.  If a generic problem is found, then it may not be possible to identify the 
location of other suspect parts.  
A mechanism for traceability should be established identifying where parts from a specific order 
or lot are located and then, from a printed circuit board (PCB) perspective, where the parts came 
from.  This two-way traceability allows identification of the extent of parts replacement should a 
problem be found. 
Pictures taken of flight boards with sufficient resolution to show installed parts type, part 
number, and orientation can provide the ability to confirm configuration after the box is accepted 
for flight.  Photographs can often provide evidence to resolve issues that might surface after the 
box is closed. 
The MIL parts community uses the government-industry data exchange program (GIDEP) alert 
system to warn other users of suspect parts.  The widespread user community provides reliability 
growth by identifying and communicating escapes that surface in the field.  Commercial parts 
are not the subject of communication among customers and therefore do not benefit from the 
advantage afforded by the GIDEP. 
In the commercial world there is not a standard convention for unique identification of part lots.  
Commercial parts often do not contain lot identification numbers and when they do, they may 
not be able to distinguish between parts made at different locations or may actually use different 
die.  So it becomes difficult to implement a thorough two-way traceability program necessary to 
identify other suspect parts. 
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9.0 Conclusions 
The fundamental question is whether COTS EEE parts with limited screening can be used in 
crewed flight systems.  The answer hinges on the assessment and control of risks associated with 
a parts-induced system failure. 
The NESC team reviewed and analyzed approaches based on screening parts only through box or 
system-level testing and concluded that there are fundamental concerns with the rationale 
(Section 6).  The approach is based on procuring commercial parts as received from a distributor 
without qualification for space or additional screening, and assembling them on circuit boards.  
Such an approach would result in assembling good parts along with any weak parts, parts with 
latent defects, and infant mortals into flight hardware with the assumption that board, box, and 
system-level testing can effectively identify parts that might fail during the anticipated mission 
lifetime. 
The team concluded that board, box, and system-level testing cannot replicate accelerating 
factors that voltage, current, and temperature stresses provide during part-level screening. 
Without bounding parts quality through a parts assurance program, large uncertainties will exist 
in parts failure rates and therefore system failure rates.  In addition, without the controls imposed 
by an assurance program there will be little confidence in numerical analyses that estimate the 
failure rates of electronics and the system.  
In general, the risks involved in electronics are controlled through design, assembly, test 
practices, and through the selection and testing of the EEE parts used in the circuits.  The risks 
associated with parts application must include assumptions regarding the performance of the 
EEE parts under the variety of environmental factors the electronics will encounter.  
There is no a priori prescription for low-risk electronics.  Even a Grade 1 Class “S” parts 
program can be defeated by improper parts application and stress issues rooted in design or 
unforeseen vibration and thermal environmental interactions with parts assembled on the board.  
Unscreened commercial parts may perform as well as Class “S” parts or they could fail 
prematurely due to reduced margins not exposed during board- or box-level testing waiting for 
the right combination of voltage, temperature, mechanical, or operational conditions to fail.  
Parts can be used with success if controlled by a top-down assurance program that assures the 
parts will perform as expected and as intended in the critical applications driving mission risk 
and safe return of the crew.  Assuring parts quality requires a supply chain management 
approach tied to the top-down assurance program.  
The risks associated with the EEE parts are controlled through an assurance program consisting 
of manufacturing controls, derating criteria, and qualification and screening tests that assure that 
they will perform as expected under the given mission environment, application, and mission 
duration.  
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The team concluded that any alternative approach for the use of COTS EEE parts in critical 
applications other than those which have proved successful, such as described in EEE-INST-002, 
or similar NASA documents, requires a firm basis for substantiation. 
To reduce the likelihood that parts failures result in unacceptable mission risk, the NESC 
recommends the CCP require vehicle providers to: 1) develop and implement a top-down 
mission assurance program to address EEE parts derating, qualification, traceability, and 
counterfeit control, and demonstrate how it mitigates the risks associated with EEE parts 
applications and 2) provide data supporting the effectiveness of the proposed screening approach 
assuring part failure rates are adequately bounded.  Section 8 of this paper provides insight into 
some of the major characteristics of a parts assurance program. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
No unique hardware, software, or data packages, outside those contained in this report, were 
disseminated to other parties outside this assessment. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System. 
12.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.  
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience.  The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap or 
failure.  A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed impact 
on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; and 
applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision that 
reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.   
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did 
not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to 
cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a 
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Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational structure, tools, and/or 
support provided. 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
Recommendation An action identified by the NESC to correct a root cause or deficiency 
identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may be used by 
the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the preparation of a 
corrective action plan. 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
13.0 Acronyms List 
A/D  analog to digital 
CAD   Computer Aided Design 
CCF   Common Cause Failure 
CCP   NASA's Commercial Crew Program  
COTS   Commercial off the shelf  
CP  Commercial Partners 
cPCI   Compact Peripheral Component Interconnect 
D/C  direct current 
DPA   destructive physical analysis  
ECMP  Electronic Component Management Plan  
EDAC  Error Detection and Correction 
EEE  Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical  
ER  Established Reliability 
ESD   Electrostatic Discharge 
FET  Field Effect Transistors  
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
GIDEP  Government-Industry Data Exchange Program 
GSFC   Goddard Space Flight Center 
IEC   International Electro-technical Commission  
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IEC-TS IEC-Technical Standard 
ISS  International Space Station 
LOC   Loss Of Crew  
LOM   Loss Of Mission 
MIL-HDBK Military Handbook 
MIPS   Millions of Instructions Per Second 
MTSO  Management Technical Support Office 
NEA  Non-Explosive Actuators  
NEPP   NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
PCB  Printed Circuit Board  
PDA   Percent Defective Allowable  
PEM  Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit 
PIND   Particle Impact Noise Detection 
PMP  Parts, Materials, and Processes 
PPAP   Production Part Approval Process 
PRA   Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
RDSon  Resistances Drain to Source (when) On 
RoHS   Restriction of Hazardous Substances  
SCD   Source Control Drawing  
TDT   Technical Discipline Team 
TS  Technical Specification 
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Appendix A. Original Request 
Objective: 
Collect additional data to help frame the technical, cost, and schedule risk trades associated with 
EEE parts selection and specifically the expressed desire of some of the CCDEV2 partners to 
employ parts of a lower grade than traditionally used in most safety critical NASA applications. 
Background: 
CCPs CCDEV2 SAAs are actively progressing.  Commercial Partners (CPs) are reviewing the 
CCP draft requirements, which includes the 1130 and 1140 volumes.  In 1130, in addition to 
several performance requirements such as an overall Loss of Crew Probability and Loss of 
Mission Probability requirement, there are also specific technical requirements associated with 
Engineering technical stds.  On EEE Parts, the CCP engineering teams selected a DoD Std 
(SMC-S-010 (2009), AFSC Space And Missile Systems Center Standard: Parts, Materials, and 
Processes (PMP) Technical Requirements For Space and Launch Vehicles (12 Jan 2009) ) as the 
basis for what the CPs need to meet the intent of.  The team selected this std with the expressed 
intent of allowing the partners to trade away from the highest grade parts (Grade 1, Class S, etc.) 
for lower grade when justified by an analysis which considers circuit criticality as well as 
mission duration and the program risk tolerance as defined by LOC and LOM.  In general, while 
the CCP EEE parts team considered the ability to trade to a lower part grade a reasonable step, 
most felt this would be a trade between Space grade and full military grade parts (Class B, 
JANTX, etc.).  Recently, during a round of technical TIMs at least one partner has express an 
interest in using parts procured from a commercial online distributor (Digikey) using the 
industrial grade (due to temperature range limitations) and do little to no upscreen or testing on 
the component at the piece part-level before installing in the board or assembly.  Their rationale 
to support this approach was that: 
1. Extensive testing at the board-and box-level equates to some portion of the testing 
required to be classified as a higher grade part. 
2. Their architecture, which is dual failure tolerance at the system-level as well as internal 
to the avionics boxes, is robust to failures. 
3. The overall increase in failure rates given these lower grade parts, when this 3-string 
architecture is considered, does not appreciably increase LOC or LOM. 
4. The use of commercial parts means a greater part selection with more nimble part lines 
which generate higher performing parts (higher millions of instructions per second 
(MIPS), lower RDSon, etc.), which offsets failure rates as performance margin is 
increased. 
5. In addition to performance, their designs can employ newer technologies not available 
in the Class S Grade 1 versions. 
6. The obvious gains in schedule and cost trades. 
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CCP EEE parts teams have heard this approach but have not been provided any formal data.  The 
team's initial reaction is that given our mission durations (15 minutes for launch vehicle and  
6 months for Spacecraft) it could be possible that a statistical analysis could support the use of 
commercial or industrial grade parts with only a minor impact to LOC or LOM.  However, 
overall, the EEE parts team within the CCP are asking for analytical support from the CPs to 
support their assertions. 
Actions: 
1. Provide back to the CCP Engineering leadership a benchmark on EEE parts selection 
criteria from commercial aviation large and small (Boeing Seattle and Cessna or 
equivalents).  It is understood that the mission duration as well as natural and induced 
environments are different.  However, this data point may help program decision-makers 
frame this risk. 
2. Given a generic architecture with dual redundancy across all elements, an assumption that 
common parts exist in each string, a typical division of LOC/LOM allocation to avionics, 
can a move from Grade 1/Class S parts to Commercial/Industrial parts with no upscreen 
really have little effect on overall LOC/LOM?  A notional analysis is requested to assess 
this assertion. 
3. Given failure rates collected in Grade 2 upscreens (PIND, X-ray, burn in, etc.) and data 
from manufacturers and the field centers, can this assessment team recommend an 
upscreen/testing regime that would improve the analysis in 2 such that the LOC/LOM 
with commercial grade parts approaches that calculated when Grade 2 (Class B, etc.) parts 
are used? 
a. Please provide a primer of parts grades and associated testing of each along with 
as assessment of what tests provide the greatest value. 
4. How does the short mission durations play into the analysis above and does the analysis 
support a different answer between launch vehicle and spacecraft? 
5. How does CCFs play into the results?  Given the likelihood of similar strings, and hence 
similar parts in similar lots across all the legs of redundancy, does common cause 
dominate the analysis results? 
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Appendix B.  Data Supporting NEPP Relative Failure Rate Factors 
Recent data providing a definitive comparison of Grades 1, 2, 3, and unscreened commercial 
parts failure rates was not found.  There is no doubt parts failure rates have been decreasing and 
have continued to decrease since the 1990 to 1995 time frame.  There is some debate, however, if 
the lower bounds have been reached due to the advent of computer aided design chip tools which 
have enabled smaller feature sizes, higher speed operation, along with denser die operating at 
lower voltages.  There is some evidence that the consumer electronics industry’s targeted design 
life of 2 to 5 years have an influence EEE parts wear-out life. 
Two data source indicate the relative reliability factors referenced in the white paper’s  
Table 5.0-1 are comparable to data available from the 1990 to 1995 time frame. 
Raw failure rate data points from Quality Magazine (Plum, 1990) replotted with approximate 
trend lines.  This source from 1990 shows the failure rate for unscreened commercial parts were 
more than 10 times higher than Class S Parts.  These data also show there is no single 
deterministic failure rate factor but implies some variability in the relative failure rate factor of 
40 for unscreened parts. 
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MIL-HDBK-217 provides parts quality for many different part types.  Four common part types 
are compared in the table below.  The parts quality factors approximately support the relative 
factors referenced by the white paper’s Table 5.0-1.   
 
Excerpts from MIL-HDBK-217F 28-Feb-1995 as Relative Factor to Class S: 
Part Micro Circuit Diode Bipolar 
Transistor 
FET 
Transistor 
217 Paragraph 5.10 6.3,    6.6 6.6, 6.7 6.4 
Class S 1 1,      1 1 1 
Class B 4 3.4     10 4 3.4 
“Lower” 8 7.8      50 10 7.8 
Plastic  11.4      100  11.4 
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